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THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE MENTALLY ILL
FOR CRIMINAL OFFENSES
JOHN R. CAVANAGH, M.D.*
S INCE THE DURHAM DECISION' on July 1, 1954, literally millions of
words have been written on this subject, some wise, some erroneous,
some unwise. Not much that is constructive has come out of all these
words. Perhaps it has not all been wasted, however, because one year
after the Durham decision there were only a few who were afflicted by
its weaknesses and ambiguities. Now, four years later, many powerful
voices are raised against it including that of the New York Governor's
Conference on the Defense of Insanity and that of the American Law
Institute, to mention only two. Now, however, when Durham is about to
return to the quietude of the green hills of New Hampshire and remain
in the memoirs of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, it is
time to take stock and see what there is of value we have discovered to
improve our knowledge of the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill.
If this subject is properly understood, radical changes in the existing
statutes may not seem so necessary.
2
*B.S. (1928),°M.D. (1930), Georgetown University. Lecturer in Psychiatry and
Pastoral Medicine at Catholic University; Associate Clinical Professor of Medicine
at Georgetown University Medical School.
I Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2 Such opinions as this are quite common in regard to the Durham decision: "Ob-
serving this, one writer concluded that 'Durham then puts forth, in my opinion, a
legal principle beclouded by a central ambiguity, both unexplained and unsupported
by its basic rationale.' The need in this area is for more clarification, and the Dur-
ham instruction does not supply it. Judge Learned Hand put it this way: 'I have
read the opinion that you mention, and perhaps it is all that can be said; but,
frankly, it did not seem to me to give us any guidance that perceptibly would help.'"
Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Cases: The Durham Rule of the M'Naghten
Rule in Illinois, J. AM. MEo. ASS'N 1491 (1957).
One of the greatest values which has
come out of the discussion following the
Durham decision is that many lawyers
have learned more about psychiatry and
psychiatrists have learned more about the
law. If this is true, as I sincerely hope, we
may soon be able to get down to hard
cases. If our future laws are to be both
scientific and just there are certain basic
subjects which must be understood by
those who frame them. These subjects will
be discussed under the following headings:
(1) The Need to Improve Communica-
tion
(2) The Psychosomatic Unity of Man
(3) Causality
(4) Responsibility
(5) Summary
The Need to Improve Communication
So much has already been said concern-
ing the numerous semantic difficulties be-
tween psychiatry and the law that it seems
there is little to be added. An excellent
example of this semantic merry-go-round
is the confusion over the relationship
between the terms "psychosis" and "insan-
ity."'' Psychiatrists have insisted that "in-
sanity" is a legal term which they do not
understand and, I may add, seem deter-
mined not to understand. 4 This insistence,
however, is of recent origin. Hinsie and
Schatzky in their Psychiatric Dictionary,
published in 1940, define fifty-two types of
"insanity." "Insanity" has not always been
a purely legal term.- "Psychosis" is a term
3 See Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Dar-
ham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC L. REV. 25 (1955).
4 Psychiatry is therefore predestined to reject cate-
gories and preconceived notions and legal tests.
ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
ACT AND PUNISHMENT 118 (1946).
5 The following would seem to indicate that as
late as 1918 "insanity" was an acceptable term:
"For the layman, the recognition of insanity in
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER, AUTUMN 1958
which has greater meaning to the psychi-
atrist but it is one which the profession
has had difficulty in defining.6 This term
is not a synonym of "insanity." It would
not, therefore, satisfy the legal require-
ments for the protection of the mentally
ill and of society.
an individual case is attended with great difficul-
ties, and this is so particularly because the insane
frequently retain sufficient power of thought and
will to completely conceal their altered condition
in all ordinary social intercourse. Often the insane
person really believes he is not sick; but even
when he knows he is not well he endeavors to
control himself so that no inopportune remark
will escape him. Unfortunately even to-day all
people look upon insanity as a disgrace and not as
an affliction. Moreover, it is generally recognized
that a person who is insane must be placed under
control. No wonder then an insane person, so far
as it lies in his interest, will concentrate his en-
deavors toward deceiving those with whom he
comes in contact." JACOBY, THE UNSOUND MIND
AND THE LAW 84 (1918) (emphasis added). Hen-
derson and Gillespie in a standard psychiatric
text published in 1951 used the word "insanity"
frequently. "Confusional insanity is not a clinical
entity on an unequal footing with the other cate-
gories of Part I.; it is nearly always, if not always,
a symptom of some one of the other mental dis-
orders." HENDERSON & GILLESPIE, A TEXT-BOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 21 (1951). "The tendency has
been to speak of 'i,npulsive insanity' as an entity
whereas it is at most only a symptom." Id. at 110
(emphasis added). "Suggestibility plays a part,
among other factors, in the genesis of folie a deux
or 'communicated insanity,' which is the term ap-
plied when two persons closely associated with
one another suffer a psychosis simultaneously, and
when one member of the pair appears to have in-
fluenced the other." Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
6 Cavanagh, op. cit. supra note 3, at 39. A satis-
factory definition of psychosis is the following:
Psychosis is ". . . either [a] temporary or pro-
longed grave deviation . . . from normalcy in
judging, reasoning and willing which . . . [is] the
result of the individual's failure to adequately
solve his conflicts and which may result in
disturbed or inappropriate emotions, delusions,
seriously irregular conduct, and deep seated per-
sonality disorganization, and other symptoms."
CAVANAGH & MCGOLDRICK, FUNDAMENTAL PSY-
CHIATRY 288 (1953).
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MENTALLY ILL
It would be best if the legal aspects of
mental illness were left to the lawyers,
and the responsibility for treatment of the
mentally ill were assumed by the medical
specialists within the framework of "due
process of law."7 Due process, as I under-
stand it, is a course of procedure approved
by the courts or by the legislature for a
particular purpose. Some psychiatrists seem
to feel that the requirements of due process
are an infringement upon their preroga-
tives.8 This is not true. Actually, not many
7 A lawyer says: "Otherwise, we indulge in wish-
ful thinking or utopia or we surrender to the
technologist, the psychiatrist or other would-be
rulers who, by their own admissions, know
nothing about values, decencies or moral respon-
sibilities." Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal
Responsibility - McNaghton Versus Durham and
the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft,
33 IND. L. REV. 212, 214 (1958).
Psychiatry says: "It may be that a sorry state
of confusion will ensue. However, the prospect
of a difficult adjustment does not do away with
the desirability of dropping a procedure which
we as psychiatrists know to be wrong. In the light
of all our understanding of personality func-
tioning today, it is impossible to defend a test of
sanity based on knowledge of right from wrong.
It has been repeated over and over again by psy-
chiatrists that even the most deeply disturbed,
the most typically insane persons, can 'tell the
difference between right and wrong.'" The
Durham Decision, Psychiatry, 18 J. FOR THE
STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES (1955).
8 "We shall mention, but only to disregard, those
within and without the profession who claim
everything for psychiatry and look upon it as a
cure-all, as the great remedy which will ultimately
rid us of criminals, of Communism, of injustices
social and personal. Such a world made safe for
psychiatry would be a rather unsafe world, for
there are so many things in this world about
which psychiatry knows so much and is able to
do so very little." ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 109 (1949).
"This hostility between psychiatry and the law
is actually being displayed every day in front of
juries, and the act can be fairly described as a
display of mutual hostility no matter who gets
the better of whom." Id. at 38.
psychiatrists are well-informed on medico-
legal matters.9
It seems clear that there is confusion
both in the psychiatric and legal minds
about the distinction between "psychosis"
and "insanity or unsoundness of mind."
"Psychosis" is defined in Psychiatric Dic-
tionary as follows:
In current psychiatry, mental disorder of a
more or less special kind, which may or may
not be associated with an organic disease. It
is not considered in keeping with the avail-
able facts to refer to a psychosis as a disease,
since the term "disease" is traditionally
identified with pathology of tissues. For
want of a better term psychiatrists speak of
mental "disorder" when they refer to the
psyche.
A psychosis is usually a severer type of
mental disorder in the sense that all forms
of adaptation (e.g., social, intellectual, pro-
fessional, religious, etc.) are disrupted. In
other words, the disorganization of the per-
sonality is extensive. The principal psychotic
syndromes are schizophrenia and manic-
depressive psychosis. When the psychic dis-
order is associated with an organic disease,
9 Circular Letter No. 225 of the Group for the
Advancement of Psychiatry reports the tabulation
and preliminary impressions gained from a ques-
tionnaire on capital punishment, distributed to the
membership of GAP, comprising 150 members
of whom 86 made returns. From this sampling
of North American psychiatry, the Committee on
Psychiatry and Law was able to develop general
conclusions of which several follow:
1. Only a few psychiatrists have an established
competence in dealing with criminal matters.
2. American courts assume that any psychia-
trist is qualified to testify affecting the disposition
of an offender. A clearly defined and accepted
standard of expertness is wanting.
3. Psychiatrists avoid giving testimony in crim-
inal cases.
4. The psychiatric profession is in need of
better definition of the actual role of the psy-
chiatrist in the trial.
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC
EXPERT TESTIMONY, COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 26, 6 n. 20 (1954).
such as general paresis, brain tumor, etc.,
the term "organic psychosis" is used for the
sake of convenience. 10
If we compare. this definition with that of
"insanity" we can readily see the difference
in meaning of the two terms.
"Insanity," although a term formerly
used in medical literature, is now regarded
by most psychiatrists as a purely legal
term. In this use it has several quite definite
meanings, e.g., in the District of Columbia,
for purposes of commitment to a mental
hospital, the term refers to the condition
of an individual who ". . . is incapable of
managing his own affairs, and is not a fit
person to be at large or to go unrestrained,
and if permitted to remain at liberty in the
District of Columbia, the rights of persons
and property will be jeopardized or the
preservation of public peace imperiled and
the commission of crime rendered probable
and that he is a fit subject for treatment
in a hospital by reason of his mental condi-
tion." In criminal cases the individual has
been considered insane and not responsible
for his offense if it was shown that "he was
laboring under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind as not to know the
nature and quality of the act, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong."'"
The terms "unsound mind" and "insan-
ity" should, therefore, be limited to those
mental states which are sufficiently severe
to require supervision and control in a
mental hospital, even without the indi-
vidual's consent, in order to protect him
from himself or to protect others in the
10HINSIE & SHATZKY, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY
446 (1947).
11 Davidson, ORIENTATION TO FORENSIC PSYCHIA-
rRY, 57 ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY. AND PSYCHIATRY
730 (1947).
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community from the effects of his illness.
"Psychosis" and "insanity" are not,
therefore, synonymous and cannot be used
interchangeably. All "psychotic" individuals
are not "insane," but all "insane persons"
are "psychotic." This at least was the state
of affairs before the Durham decision. Now,
with the broadening of the legal meaning
of the term "insanity" which came with
that decision, it may mean that sociopathic
personalities, neurotics or other individuals
with non-psychotic disorders may be
classed as "insane" if the jury finds them
"not guilty by reason of insanity." The
psychiatrist in testifying under the Durham
rule may interpret this decision to charac-
terize as mental illness any mental state
from a mild neurosis to the severe psy-
chosis. This is one of the greatest defects
of the Durham rule. 12
This distinction between the psychiatric
and legal definitions is necessary because,
although all physicians do not realize it,
there is no law which requires an indi-
vidual to accept treatment for disease. The
mentally ill person is not committed to a
mental hospital for treatment per se but
only until he is no longer considered "in-
sane," i.e., no longer a danger to himself or
society. This need for a legal definition of
mental illness arises because the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution states that
no one may be deprived of his liberty with-
out "due process" of law. Due process is
obviously a legal and not a psychiatric
responsibility. This distinction between
"psychosis" and "insanity" should help to
clarify some of the issues between the pro-
fessions if it is clearly understood.
Psychiatrists have praised the Durham
12 See O'Brien, Psychiatry and the Defense of
Insanity, 4 BULL. GUILD OF CATHOLIC PSYCHIA-
TRISTs 3 (1956).
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decision because it allows them to speak in
a psychiatric frame of reference without
limitation by -arbitrary rules of testimony
set up by the M'Naghten rules. Personally,
I have never felt this restriction and have
seldom been limited in my direct testimony.
This experience has been shared by
others.1 3 Any future legislation should per-
mit a reasonable amount of free discussion
of the case in its pertinent clinical features.
This discussion could give to the court and
jury a background against which they may
judge the degree of responsibility of the
accused. There is, however, no value in
the introduction of unconscious mental
factors to the jury. It could only result in
confusion. 14 The court is concerned with
conscious factors. The mens rea is formed
13 "In the Brannen case in Queens County, State
of New York, a psychiatrist was asked the ques-
tion, 'What is psychosis?' and instead of being
limited to a brief answer was permitted to go up
in front of the jury box and with pencil and
paper explain schematically the relationship be-
tween quantity of ego functioning and psychosis.
This was made possible by a team of competent
defense lawyers, and even more important, an
alert, curious and tolerant judge. One wonders
whether Judge Farrell was even interested in
adding to medico-legal history when he agreed
that the psychiatrist may use diagrams in clari-
fying his clinical points. Later, the same lawyers
and in the same case, further attacked the status
quo when they were successful in a habeas corpus
writ and obtained Brannen's release from Mat-
teawan without referral to the court of original
jurisdiction." Orenstein & Weisstein, Temporary
Insanity as a Defense, 115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
125 (1958).
14 There are some who disagree with this opinion.
See, e.g., "If the psychiatrist is to discover the
basis of such unlawful behavior, to understand
the offender, and serve a purpose in the trial, he
must go beyond the act itself and evaluate the
total personality both in its conscious and uncon-
scious aspects." COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 2. "As a
rule the defendant 'knows' the facts of his crime
in consciousness. The court in arriving at
a verdict is not concerned with repressed
material. Such material may be helpful in
determining the sentence, but not in arriv-
at a verdict. Responsibility for his act will
be based upon the patient's subjective judg-
ment of his act as right or wrong. When
reference is made to right and wrong the
reference is to the right and wrong of the
objective order. That is to say, the mentally
ill man has misapprehensions of objective
reality, i.e., he has an erroneous subjective
judgment of what reality is. The presence
of such misrepresentations of reality would
not, in itself, relieve a man of responsibility.
It would do so, however, if this misappre-
hension was due to mental illness. It would
undoubtedly relieve him of any respon-
sibility if because of mental illness he
sincerely believed, on the basis of his mis-
representations, that he was doing right. It
is such conscious factors which are impor-
tant to the court, not all of the unconscious
factors which brought about his illness. 5
and knows its unlawfulness and consequences,
but he does not know the unconscious basis for it.
The task of the psychiatrist is to perceive the
unconscious basis of the unlawful act and the
nature of the inner conflict, but in action the law
would confine his exploration to the familiar ter-
ritory of the conscious." Id. at 6. "Half of that
century has already gone by, and here and there
some experts are permitted to testify as to the
unconscious reactions of the accused-but I am
afraid that the hope, if any, will lie in the twenty-
first century, Dr. Godding's aspirations and our
efforts to the contrary notwithstanding." ZILBOORG,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND
PUNISHMENT 121-22 (1949).
15 To' illustrate what I am talking about, let me
refer to the Durham case. "According to the
psychiatric testimony, Durham had the following
symptoms: He was hearing false voices. He suf-
fered from hallucinations. He believed that others
[employees and others] in the store talked about
him, watched him. [He believed] . . . the neigh-
bors did the same, watching him from their
windows, talking about him. According to his
The introduction of the unconscious to
the jury as recommended by many psychi-
atrists would not assist and could only con-
fuse them. Consider, for example, a case in
which the individual had been raised by a
cruel punishing father. As he grew older he
repressed some of this feeling but retained
a resentment of all authoritative figures. If
this man in adult life commits an offense
against an authoritative figure would he be
relieved of responsibility merely because it
is revealed that his crime was the result of
a repressed hatred of his father?
Not all the differences between lawyers
and psychiatrists are based on semantic
problems. There is little doubt that many
psychiatrists are offended by the adversary
atmosphere of the courtroom. 16 They can-
not tolerate some of the methods of cross-
examination which threaten their feelings
of omnipotence. 17 Strong feelings of self-
confidence are necessary for success in the
practice of medicine. When, however, this
feeling rests on an insecure foundation, it
is easily toppled. Psychiatry has not yet
reached such secure foundations that psy-
chiatric opinion can be offered with apo-
mother's testimony 'he seemed afraid of people.'
But note what Durham concludes from these
premises: there ought to be steel bars on his
bedroom windows-which is a perfectly con-
sistent subjective conclusion on the basis of the
misjudgements he has already made." CAVANAGH,
A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5
CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 25, 37 (1955).
16 "Our courtrooms still lend themselves well to
the expression of this hostility toward psychiatry.
The psychiatrist is treated with considerable
scorn." ZILBOORG, op. cit. supra note 14, at 111.
17 "It is this contact that makes the psychiatrist
so vulnerable; it is very difficult indeed to be
touching the unchartered and unexplored depths
of human baseness and human greatness without
giving in at times to the temptation of appearing
the very master, the megalomanic psychological
manager of man and even mankind." Id. at 121.
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dictic assurance. It cannot be proved with
the accuracy of a mathematical formula. A
psychiatrist who approaches the court with
a proper degree of humility will experience
little difficulty in testifying. "Humility" is
used here in the proper meaning of the
word, i.e., freedom from pride and arro-
gance. It does not imply any feelings of
inferiority or obsequiousness. He should
testify as to his honest opinion based on his
interpretation of the case.' 8
It should be pointed out that there can
be an honest difference of opinion between
psychiatrists. Psychiatric disorders are a
matter of degree.' 9 They may vary from
mild deviation from normality to a complete
loss of contact with reality. There may well
be a difference of opinion between psychi-
atrists as to the extent of loss of contact
with reality. At the extremes of seriousness
there will be little difference of opinion.
However, as the median is approached
opinions may differ. Examinations con-
ducted at different times may yield differ-
ent results because the patient's condition
may fluctuate from day to day. There may
be clear evidence of a psychosis at one time
18 "Psychiatrists themselves have become increas-
ingly aware of the limitations of their own knowl-
edge and the need for further research. One must
realize that psychiatry as yet is unable to thor-
oughly understand on a scientific basis many
aspects of mental disorder and its treatment. To
the many problems facing psychiatry, the solution
will come only through further research." Gott-
lieb & Tourney, Commitment Procedures and the
Advancement of Psychiatric Knowledge, 115 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 110 (1958). "A certain amount of
modesty on the part of the psychiatrist in ap-
proaching human behavior, with his acceptance
that there is a great deal that he does not know
about it, and therefore his emphasis on the need
for research in the field has improved, and should
continue to improve, his relationship with the
lawyer." Id. at 111.
19 CAVANAGH & McGOLDRICK, FUNDAMENTAL PSY-
CHIATRY 26-28 (1953).
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which the patient is able to conceal at other
times. In spite of this fluctuation in the
patient's mental condition there is not likely
to be too much difference of opinion in
regard to the presence or absence of a
"psychosis" if the examination is complete
and thorough. The difference is likely to
arise over the question of whether the
patient is "insane." This question is more
subject to individual opinion and more
dependent on the experience and training
of the psychiatrist. Such honest difference
of opinion should be understood by the
court. These differences would probably be
best reconciled by the appointment of a
panel of psychiatrists by the court with the
consent of both parties. Such a panel would
be available for cross-examination by both
prosecution and defense attorneys.
There has been much criticism of the
fact that psychiatrists are likely to change
their opinions concerning psychiatric con-
cepts from time to time and even overnight.
Some of this is not so much the fault of
psychiatry but of psychiatrists who, because
of reasons best known to themselves, must
strive hard to retain their omnipotence.2 0
20"Differences of opinion among psychiatrists
when testifying in open courts are, of course, a
common occurrence. The doubts thus created are
accentuated by the fact that even the same group
of psychiatrists may testify differently on the
same topic at different times. For example, until
a few weeks ago, members of the medical staff
of an outstanding mental hospital were in the
habit of testifying that a psychopathic or socio-
pathic personality did not constitute a mental
disease. Recently, however, a formal announce-
ment was made by the acting head of that insti-
tution that thereafter members of the staff would
express the opinion that such a mental state is
in fact a mental disease. In other words, the con-
cept was changed overnight by the psychiatrists
themselves." In re Rosenfield, Habeas Corpus
119-57, p. 6 (D.D.C.). A few days later, a staff
physician, testifying in open court in reply to a
question of the judge as to whether all the phy-
It should be realized, of course, that psy-
chiatry is not a static but a dynamic science
which is subject to change from time to
time.
This brief discussion does not pretend to
exhaust the problems in the area of com-
munication. It is to be hoped that it points
to some of the areas where more attempts
to achieve something more than peaceful
coexistence may be made. Much has been
achieved, more can be, if both professions
approach the conference table with true
humility.2 1
The Psychosomatic Unity of Man
It may seem presumptuous to address a
group of professional men on the subject of
the psychosomatic unity of man. My excuse
for doing so is that a great deal of scorn
has been heaped on what has been referred
to as the "outmoded faculty concept of
mental functioning." This peremptory re-
jection of the product of generations of
thought by the world's greatest philosophers
is offensive to me. It usually indicates a
failure to understand the dynamic signifi-
cance of the faculty concept of mental func-
tioning. It also indicates the regrettable
sicians on the staff of the hospital agreed with
the announcement of the Assistant Superintendent,
replied in substance that all the staff physicians
did not agree but that no one could be sent to
testify who did not concur.
The most obvious deduction to be drawn" from
these events is that the lack of clarity of the
Durham rule is to be solved by administrative
decision. If this is so, what happens to the great
freedom of the psychiatrist to testify in terms of
his own choice under Durham? Are psychiatric
determinations to be made by administrative proc-
lamation?
21 "Psychiatry too, studies many aspects of human
behavior, its deviations, motivating forces, and
along with law, techniques of control and modi-
fication. Therefore, it is inevitable that significant
interdependences between law and psychiatry
exist, and each must take cognizance of the other
development of a spirit of materialism in
philosophy. The first obstacle to material-
istic thinking is the soul. Considered as a
threat, it is rejected. After the soul must go
the faculties as faculties, for it has been the
mark of modern philosophy, although not
without its echo in earlier ages, to destroy
all that is spiritual in man. This rejecting
attitude has brought into the foreground the
question of the mind-will relationship. Since
the battle cry seems to be "deny man his
freedom," the borderline between the oper-
ation of the faculties. of mind and will are
being gradually eliminated. Thought and
will in operation have become one. To
solve the "apparent" dualisr0 of the
thought-will processes, various explanations
have been proposed. The pages of modern
textbooks and histories of philosophy are
filled with the lengthy, obscure and hope-
lessly inadequate results.2 2 It was at this
point that parallelism entered psychology.
The invasion of materialism, however, is
not complete as long as the problem of
freedom remains. The materialist cannot
logically deny the fact that man feels that
he is free in some of his acts. They accept
the testimony of man that he feels that he
is free, but deny the validity of this belief
in his freedom.
While this activity was going on on one
front, a more advanced psychology ap-
proached the difficulty from another angle.
Their pronouncement amounted to a denial
that there was actually any problem at all.
Consciousness, which gave testimony to
freedom, was itself suspect, a hand-down
of medieval speculation with which a "sci-
to handle the intricate and perplexing problems
of human behavior." Gottlieb & Tourney, op cit.
supra note 18, at 109.
22 Cf. 2 FORBES, PSYCHOLOGIA SPECULATIVA
307-19 (1927).
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entific" psychology could have no real con-
cprn. This "science" set as its goal the
study of stimuli and reactions in the human
body; to co-ordinate in a psychology clinic
the behavior of the organism under the
stress and strain of experimentation.
One can foresee immediately what would
result from this. Obviously, at this stage of
the discussion, detailed investigations into
the thought-will relationships became as
outmoded as blood-letting. There could
exist no parallel where there existed at best
only one line of activity. At such a point
modern philosophy can rightly be said to
have abandoned the entire question. Only
recently has data been brought forth by
scientists themselves to build once again the
crumbled structure that was once known as
rational man.
23
Before we leave this historical summary,
a brief review of the effects of the onslaught
is in order. In the first place, it is true,
tragically so in fact, that disastrous as is
the rejection of the foundations of scho-
lastic philosophy in itself, a war in the
world of metaphysics would not be so ter-
rifying if it ended there. Such, of course,
is never the case. When the fundamental
doctrine of freedom fell, ethics fell also. It
was no longer a normative science, but, like
so many modern subjects, became almost
completely statistical and historical in its
method. It traced conventions; it made the
substitution of "mores," or like terms, for
morals. As Dr. Pace has said, under this
new ethical system, moral life was upheld
without dependence upon the moral.law.2 4
23 The names of De Broglie, Planck, and Milikan
immediately suggest themselves as representative
of this attitude of mind toward vitalism, freedom,
etc.
2 4 Pace, The Problem of Freedom, NEW SCHO-
LASTICISM 317 (1936).
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The formal object of ethics was no longer
the right ordering of the free acts of man
to their proper end, but rather a species of
determined activities of human agents. In-
deed, ethics were now supposed to possess
for the first time a truly scientific character.
Scientists were delving in their spare mo-
ments into the field of morality just as
championship bridge players were writing
on international politics during the past
war. Thus Albert Einstein, the eminent
physicist, wrote during the early 1920's:
I do not believe we can have freedom at
all in the philosophic sense, for we act not
only under external compulsion but also by
inner necessity. Schopenhauer's saying, "A
man can surely do what he wills, but he can-
not determine what he wills." - impressed
itself upon me in my youth and has always
consoled me when I have witnessed or suf-
fered life's hardships. This conception is a
perpetual breeder of tolerance, for it does
not allow us to take ourselves too seriously;
it makes rather for a sense of humor. 25
Against this background no apology is
needed to review a non-materialistic con-
cept of mind-will relationship. 26 Properly
understood, the scholastic concept of the
structure of the personality would be very
helpful in arriving at an understanding of
responsibility. Man functions as a unit.
What affects one part affects all other parts.
Physical illness and mental illness form a
continuum. What is more important for our
purpose is the fact that when one aspect of
the personality is affected, all other aspects
of the personality are affected in a propor-
tion related to the severity of the original
disturbance. When the Court in the Durham
25 Einstein, What I Believe, FORUM (1930), as
cited in Pace, op. cit. supra note 24, at 313.
26 See CUTLER, THE METAPHYSICAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE INTELLECT AND WILL, UNDER ITS
ASPECT OF FREEDOM (unpublished thesis, Boston
College, June 1948).
decision spoke of the knowledge of "right
and wrong" as being a symptom, they
should have said that in view of the psycho-
somatic unity of man this knowledge was
actually an integral part of the disorder.
The value of the "right and wrong" concept
is that it is a more easily measurable aspect
of the mind than any other except intelli-
gence. One cannot measure affect, or imagi-
nation, or will, but we can measure ethical
values, and we can measure the accuracy
of the individual's subjective evaluation of
reality. 27
The Psychic Structure
For descriptive purposes the personality
must be described piecemeal, but it should
not be pictured as a compartmented struc-
ture. It is actually functioning as a unit with
a constant frictionless interchange between
its component parts. It is as if each com-
ponent was a mirror which by its reflection
activates the other components. As long as
each mirror reflects its proper degree of
light in the right direction and with proper
intensity there is a normal interchange. If
something happens to one or more of the
mirrors it will disturb the whole mechanism.
So it is with the component parts of the
mind.
Cognition starts with the perception of
27 "The second point that I think we must hold
on to is the relationship between intelligence and
the control of conduct. If we look about us and
visualize the magnificent structures of science and
legal systems and ethics, we attribute these great
achievements to man's capacity for thought, to
human understanding. Can we then allow psy-
chiatrists or any other specialists to persuade us
that human understanding has no effective rela-
tionship to the commission of the serious harms
that are the concern of criminal law?" Hall,
Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility -
McNaghton Versus Durham and the American
Law Institute's Tentative Draft, 33 IND. L. REV.
212, 214 (1958).
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The Psychic Apparatus
an object in external reality (see diagram).
This knowledge is conveyed through the
external senses to the Synthetic Sense.
The Synthetic Sense is an internal power
which perceives, unites, and classifies in
the conscious beholder various impressions
from the outside world. The Synthetic
Sense (central sense) is stimulated by the
external senses and co-ordinates their indi-
vidual sensations into an understood com-
posite.
The synthesized data of the Synthetic
Sense are acted upon by the Cogitative
Power which picks up "insensate" qualities
of the external object or situation which
are not grasped by the external senses,
e.g., sequential relationships, benefit or
harmfulness of the external object, useful-
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ness, etc. Moreover, the Cogitative Power
will unite the data of the present sense
experience with data which it draws on
from the imagination and memory. The
Cogitative Power will collate all these data
to produce a unified "sense-evaluation" of
the object. This "sense-evaluation" (this
"sizing-up") of the object by the Cogita-
tive Power is called the Experimentum.
Simultaneously with Cognition at the
sense level there is an Appetitive Reaction
at the sense level (i.e., an emotional reac-
tion). This emotional reaction will be
determined partly -by the contents of the
Imagination, Memory, Synthetic Sense and
Cogitative Power. (The intensity of effect
from each of these may be further modified
by Habit.) The emotional reaction will also
be partly determined by the physiological
condition of the individual at the particular
moment.
In receiving the "insensate" qualities of
this Irmmediate Object, the Memory reacts,
and by the Laws of Association begins
reproducing past sense experiences which
are either similar or contrasted or con-
tiguous in place or time. These past sense
experiences are brought back to the Cogita-
tive Power which uses them (not all nec-
essarily on the conscious level) to form a
synthesized sense experience called the
Experimentum.
Imagination is an internal Cognitive
Power which is stimulated by the synthetic
sense and (a) preserves the images of ob-
jects perceived by the external senses, (b)
recalls the images so retained, (c) creates
or combines new groupings of images, (d)
does not recognize the images as past or as
representing past events, but relives the
past as though it were present, and (e)
projects the images.
The Imagination by its power of forming
new groupings of images can easily have
disastrous as well as beneficial effects in the
life of the individual.
Moderately exercised, the Imagination
is helpful. In the most normal man there
is a certain play of imagery which is harm-
less and even beneficial when kept under
control, In pathological instances, because
of the harassing recollection of ill-resolved
early conflicts, the individual feels the need
to escape from a sense of frustration which
threatens to crush him. This frustration
manifests itself in fear, anxiety, worry, and
feelings of inferiority. In attempting to
escape from conflict, regression to the realm
of creative imagination may satisfy every
desire. The individual who has from earliest
days met his conflicts in a non-satisfactory
manner feels frustrated and experiences an
urgent inner need for some type of substi-
tute gratification, some escape from his
haunting sense of failure. This he finds in
images.
Unlike the Memory, the Imagination has
no concept of time and thus it relives the
past as though it were here and now present.
There is no past for the Imagination.
In spite of what has been said, it should
be remembered that the primary function
of the Imagination is to retain and repro-
duce the images received through the exter-
nal senses. It is only a secondary function,
but nevertheless an important one from
the psychiatric standpoint, when it is con-
sidered in the sense of fancy or Imagina-
tion. It should be remembered that the
elements of the images reproduced in the
Imagination have actually been experi-
enced. In the secondary sense just men-
tioned these images are rearranged and
create new impressions. The possibility of
nation and the Memory. This individuated
material is then presented to the intellect.
The Intellect acts upon the data pre-
sented to it by the senses (primarily through
the Cogitative Power) and picks up the
universal aspects to be recognized in the
External Object (or situation). The Prac-
tical Intellect evaluates the object (or situ-
ation) on the level of Universality (whereas
the Cogitative Power evaluates the object
as individuated).
The Practical Intellect judges that this
object, in these circumstances, is in some
respect or respects good or evil, and there-
fore should be chosen or rejected by the
Will. Metaphysically, the Will must choose
an object as good, or reject it as evil. The
Will cannot choose evil as such or reject
good as such, and the good or evil aspect of
an object which moves the Will to choice or
rejection must be presented to the Will by
the Intellect.
The Will then considers the material
presented to it by the Intellect. The Person
possessing the Will makes his choice
through the Will. The Practical Intellect
may present to the Will a judgment that a
given object, as it exists in a concrete situ-
ation, is good or evil with reference to qual-
ities apprehended by, to list just a few of
the cognitive faculties, Sight, Hearing,
Taste, Touch, Smell, Synthetic Sense,
Memory, Imagination, Cogitative Power, or
Intellect itself.
The total presentation, in a given case,
may be weighted in favor of the qualities
apprehended as good by one or more of the
powers named. If the Person has developed
one of these powers by Habit, for example,
to the detriment of certain other powers,
this Habit may serve as an influence upon
a more ready choice by the person toward
some particular good rather than another.
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Similarly, Emotion may weight the good
apprehended by one power or another.
Or the person may maneuver certain of
his Cogitative Powers by intermediate acts
of the Will before he comes to his practi-
cal judgment. For example, in evaluating
a concrete situation, the person may refuse
to let Memory carry out its full role. In
such a case, the contents of Memory would
not be available to the Cogitative Power in
collating data for the Experimentum. Then
the data of the Experimentum, and the prac-
tical judgment based thereon, would be
distorted to the extent that the contents of
Memory were refused by the Will. A con-
stant refusal would develop an habitual reac-
tion which in turn contributes its influence.
Even after the practical judgment has
determined that a given object in its present
situation should be chosen or rejected by
the Will, the Will is not necessitated to fol-
low the counsel offered. If the counsel does
not accord with the Will's inclination, the
Will can direct the Intellect to revise its
practical judgment and conform it to the
Will's inclination. By Emotion and Habit,
principally, the Will is inclined to choose
some particular sorts of good and to reject
others.
The Will must be considered under two
aspects. In the ultimate act of choice, the
Will accepts or rejects the object - in this
act, one cannot speak of degrees of choice.
In a dynamic sense - considering the entire
process by which choice is made, and not
its ultimate act alone - the Will may be
considered as affected by many factors both
conscious and unconscious (such as Mem-
ory, Imagination, Habits, etc.). In this dy-
namic sense there may be degrees of choice
which would result in varying degrees of
responsibility. It must be emphasized that
man is responsible only for his free acts. If
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there is no freedom there is no responsi-
bility.
In summary, as we view the personality
in this frame of reference it becomes clear:
(1) that man functions as a unit;
(2) that he possesses a freedom to act
or not to act;
(3) that disturbances in one part of the
personality produce a disturbance
in all other parts;
(4) that much of the mental function-
ing is in reference to a "particular
act";
(5) that the ethical sense is more easily
measured than any other aspect of
the mental apparatus except intelli-
gence.
The determination of the individual's
knowledge of "right or wrong" in regard
to "the particular act" at the time he per-
formed it is not a symptom alone but an
integral part of the personality which has
been affected by mental illness. Each mental
illness predominately affects one part of
the personality. In the schizophrenic, for
example, it is the Imagination, in the socio-
pathic personality it is the evaluative func-
tion of the Practical Intellect. Space does
not permit a discussion of this material at
this time.2 8
28 Almost all of the psychiatrists who have written
on the subject of "right and wrong" imply that
the M'Naghten rules require an abstract knowl-
edge of "right and wrong." This is not the case.
They require only that the individual know that
the particular act with which he is charged was
frowned upon by society. Specifically, the rules
state:
[Q. II] "What are the proper questions to be
submitted to the jury where a person alleged to
be afflicted with insane delusions respecting one
or more particular subjects or persons, is charged
with the commission of a crime [murder, for
example], and insanity is set up as a defense?"
[Q. III] "In what terms ought the questions to
be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of
mind, at the time when the act was committed?"
Causality
A cause is that which positively influ-
ences or brings about or produces the exis-
tence of something else. Can we ever say
with certainty that in this sense any criminal
offense was caused by mental illness? Or
could we state the contrary with equal cer-
[A. It and 111] ". . . [A]s these two questions
appear to us to be more conveniently answered
together, we submit our opinion to be that the
jury ought to be told in all cases that every man
is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a
sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for
his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their
satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of committing the act, the
accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting
the latter part of the question to the jury on
these occasions had generally been, whether the
accused at the time of doing the act knew the
difference between right and wrong: which mode,
though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake
with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate
when put generally and in the abstract, as when
put with reference to the party's knowledge of
right and wrong, in respect to the very act with
which he is charged. If the question were to be
put as to the knowledge of the accused solely
and exclusively with reference to the law of the
land, it might tend to confound the jury, by
inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge
of the law of the land was essential in order to
lead to a conviction: whereas the law is adminis-
tered upon the principle that every one must be
taken conclusively to know it, without proof that
he does know it. If the accused was conscious
that the act was one that he ought not to do, and
if that act was at the same time contrary to
the law of the land, he is punishable; and the
usual course therefore, has been to leave the
question to the jury, whether the accused had a
sufficient degree of reason to know that he was
doing an act that was wrong; and this course
we think is correct, accompanied with such obser-
vations and explanations as the circumstances of
each particular case may require." M'Naghten's
Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 203, 208, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 720, 723 (H.L. 1843) (emphasis added).
tainty, i.e., did the mental illness cause the
crime? Or could we more easily state that
because of faulty subjective judgments
based on mental illness the individual com-
mitted the offense? This would seem to be
true.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit not only
does no t explain what it means by causality
but compounds the confusion by contra-
dicting in the second paragraph what it says
in the first.
When we say the defense of insanity requires
that the act be a "product of" a disease,
we do not mean that it must be a direct
emission, or a proximate creation, or an
immediate issue of the disease in the sense,
for example, of Hadfield's delusion that the
Almighty had directed him to -shoot George
III ....
There must be a relationship between the
disease and the act, and that relationship,
whatever it may be in degree, must be, as
we have already said, critical in its effect in
respect to the act. By "critical" we mean
decisive, determinative, causal; we mean to
convey the idea inherent in the phrases
"because of", "except for", "without which",
"but for", "effect of", "result of", "causative
factor"; the disease made the effective or
decisive difference between doing and not
doing the act. The short phrases "product
of" and "causal connection" are not in-
tended- to be precise, as though they were
chemical formulae. They mean that the
facts concerning the disease and the facts
concerning the act are such as to justify
reasonably the conclusion that "But for this
disease the act would not have been com-
mitted." 20
What are we to think of the relationship
of cause and effect in the case of a schizo-
phrenic patient who because he is hungry
or in need of funds robs a filling station?
Did the illness produce the offense in this
29 Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616-17
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (emphasis added).
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case?
Why do so few schizophrenics commit
crimes? Is there not some other factor to be
considered? Is "productivity" a legal or a
medical question? What is so imperfectly
spelled out cannot help but confuse a jury
and by the mere fact of being imperfectly
defined may be altered by jury after jury
so that there will be no uniformity in the
administration of the law.
Psychiatrists cannot fail to have difficulty
in channeling their views into this narrow
passageway. Legal responsibility should not
be concerned with such a nebulous relation-
ship. Responsibility should be concerned
only with whether the criminal act was
intimately interwoven into the texture of the
mental illness and was a predictable out-
growth of it. Causality too frequently has a
doubtful meaning when applied to psychi-
atric concepts.
Responsibility
Responsibility results from the recogni-
tion by the average man that he is answer-
able to a higher authority, whether parents,
city, state, or God, for approval or blame.
Such answerability has no meaning unless
the individual is capable of earning reward
or meriting blame; in other words, unless
he possesses a free will. Responsibility de-
pends on free will as effect depends on
cause. All men at all times have recognized
that culpability for a free act is a reality.
The word "responsibility" has a different
meaning for many of those who use it. Sir
James Stephen 30 points out that to the law-
yer it means one thing - to the physician
and the average layman, who makes up the
jury, it may mean something entirely differ-
ent. Frym states, "Therefore, our medieval
30 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN
ENGLAND 127 (1883):
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concept of responsibility no longer can be
defended effectively."'31 Frym is not the only
one to express this thought. Such denials of
responsibility for the acts which we commit
may offer some degree of comfort for those
who wish to have their cake and eat it too,
but the idea of responsibility is not merely
a gratuitous assumption. It is shown from
the fact that the laws of all countries accept
it and, in practice, all schools of philosophy,
even the determinists, at least implicitly
admit it. It seems clear that without respon-
sibility there could be no law to direct and
harmonize the social body. Wharton, some-
what reluctantly, agrees with this opinion.3 2
He says, "No matter what may be our
speculative views as to the existence of
conscience or of freedom of action we are
obliged when determining responsibility to
affirm both." Forester, in Faith of an
Agnostic says, "If we give up free will,
then we must give up moral responsibility
with it. And this in practice we cannot do.
We are bound to assume that men are free
agents and responsible for their actions. '33
Responsibility, therefore, presupposes the
liberty of the agent and implies the con-
sciousness of his obligation to account for
his actions. It is "accountability for conduct
in the case of afi agent possessing knowl-
edge of the [moral] law with power to gov-
ern conduct in harmony with such law." '34
On the assumption that all criminals are
sick and thereby deprived of their free will
it has become popular on the part of some
psychiatrists to say they deserve treatment
rather than censure. This is probably not
true, but even if it were, psychiatry has no
31 Frym, The Criminal Intent, 31 TEXAS L. REV.
260,278 (1953).
32 See CAMMACK, MORAL PROBLEMS OF MENTAL
DEFECT 15 (1939).
3i Id. at 13.
s4 Id. at 14.
effective treatment for such offenders which
would be any more effective than that pro-
vided by present legal means.3 5
Summary
In conclusion, the following principles
should be adhered to in any rules for deter-
mining responsibility for conduct in those
who are mentally ill:
(1) The basic tenets of the M'Naghten
rules as properly understood. In
this test the defendant's responsi-
bility should be determined on the
basis of his subjective judgment of
the nature and quality of the partic-
ular act of which he is charged.3 6
35 "However, within the present framework of our
psychiatric knowledge, the management of these
disorders as well as the criminal depends pri-
marily upon sound legal principles. Psychiatric
examination and treatment may be a help in such
management but the majority of such individuals
must still be handled largely by current legal
methods. These areas wait patiently for significant
investigation from the psychiatric viewpoint to
add to our knowledge techniques of management
and therapy before there may be a change in the
legal framework." Gottlieb & Tourney, Commit-
ment Procedures and the Advancement of Psy-
chiatric Knowledge, 115 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 110
(1958). "One can think along such lines without
considering every crime the product of some
disease, for such a point of view would be ex-
tremely erroneous: not every criminal is ill, not
every crime is a result of psychological pathol-
ogy." ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIM-
INAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 43 (1949). "Many
undeterrable offenders are treated as if they are
'sane' and sent to prison to be released at the
termination of sentence, free to repeat the cycle.
As matters stand, as a device of criminal law
administration, the Rules touch only a fraction
of undeterrable mentally ill. In this there is no
security for the law-abiding community." CRIMI-
NAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT
TESTIMONY, COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSY-
CHIATRY, REPORT No. 26, 4 (1954).
36 " 'Knowledge' assumes not only external sens-
ory perception of the act but the internal under-
standing of the nature of the criminal act. Such
(2) The "unresisted urge test," some-
times erroneously known as the
irresistible impulse test, should be re-
tained. Under this test the individual
is considered not responsible when,
even if he knows what is right, he
is unable by reason of mental illness
to adhere to this judgment. Properly
understood, this concept preserves
the principle of the freedom of the
will.37 Without individual freedom
there is no basis for the criminal
law.
(3) Since every act is based on a con-
scious (if erroneous) subjective
judgment, there is no value in intro-
ducing the Unconscious to the jury.
The Unconscious undoubtedly influ-
ences but does not determine the
individual's behavior.
(4) Psychiatric testimony concerning the
patient's mental state should be un-
hampered in its presentation to the
jury. However, at its conclusion
properly directed questions designed
to serve as guideposts for the jury
in regard to the defendant's respon.
sibility should be asked.38
understanding, if purely 'verbal and not affective,'
is deficient knowledge at best. Professor Weihofen
states: If the word 'know' were given this broader
interpretation, so as to require knowledge 'fused
with affect' and assimilated by the whole per-
sonality - so that, for example, the killer was
capable of identifying with his prospective vic-
tim - much of the criticism of the knowledge test
would be met." WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS
A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, as cited in O'Brien, Psy-
chiatry and the Defense of Insanity, 4 -BULL.
GUILD OF CATHOLIC PSYCHIATRISTS 3, 12 (1956).
37 Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durhamn
Decision, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 25, 45-48 (1955).
38 "The plain McNaghten Rule states the case in
language that jurors and other laymen can under-
stand, and that justifies its phraseology, even if
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(5) The psychiatrist's opinion must be
his own and unhampered by admin-
istrative decision.
(6) The principle of individual freedom
to act or not to act must be pre-
served.
(7) The difference between responsibil-
ity and guilt must be clearly under-
stood.3 9
Continued on page 368
it annoys some psychiatrists. As 1 have said, it is
the test of reason. To be insane, to be psychotic
means to be irrational." Hall, Mental Disease
and Criminal Responsibility - McNaghton Versus
Durham and the American Law Institute's Ten-
tative Draft, 33 IND. L. REV. 212, 214 (1958).
39 "Responsibility in its derivation means ability
to react to a situation, that is to respond to
punishment or to be deterred by punishment.
There is frequent failure to understand the dif-
ference between responsibility and guilt. I am
presumptuous enough to believe that 1 can detect
this error in the GAP Report. It seems to presume
that the psychiatrist who says that an individual
is responsible is finding him guilty. How else is
one to understand such a statement as the fol-
lowing: 'Often the psychiatrist learns too late
that the existence of psychosis a's such at the
time of the offense does not automatically exempt
the offender from punishment. He knows that
the psychosis about which he is testifying involves
a very distinct appreciation of society's judge-
ments of 'right and wrong' but finds too late
that in affirming this he has answered so as to
convict the defendant. Only in cases of disturbed
consciousness or of idiocy can the psychiatrist
make honest replies to the M'Naghten test
questions'." [COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSY-
CHIATRY, op. cit. supra note 35, at 5.] "This
concept is certainly in error. The examination of
an individual to determine his responsibility for
his acts is clearly a psychiatric function regardless
of what method is used to come to this conclu-
sion. Having arrived at such a conclusion the
psychiatrist has concluded his part in the matter.
The further determination of whether the indi-
vidual is guilty is a matter for the judge and jury."
Cavanagh, supra note 37, at 35.
